Defying most polls, Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan was able to secure re-election as the country’s president after two rounds of voting in May 2023. Turkey’s strategic location has offered it considerable footing in international relations since the early days of the Soviet Union and the subsequent relations the latter had with the United States particularly in the post-WWII period. Eventually as Turkey experienced significant changes in its foreign policy given its history of military coups and successive different regimes. Grand historical events externally, such as geopolitical competition, significant internal events where different policies in international relations were put forward, coupled with the country’s geographic location has made the Republic of Turkey a contender for allyship for Russia, the US, the EU, Iran and as of recently, the Arab World, China and Pakistan. In recognition of how binary the post-WWII international area was, being allies with one camp often meant being enemies (alternatively frenemies) with the another.

Since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, there have been discussions particularly in academic and political circles about a “new international order.” Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the USSR, liberalism became prevalent in foreign affairs on the international stage. Voices complaining about liberalism’s shortcomings or alternatively, disregarding it completely, were often ridiculed if not suppressed. Russia’s invasion has brought about a grander conversation: was the international system spearheaded by the West ever liberal?

A closer look at individual cases would only show that liberalism maintained the façade of a realist international order. For example, this was particularly exemplified with the understanding that countries such as Ukraine are in Russia’s “backyard” or sphere of influence. This understanding could be paralleled to how the West also used to see the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine made it easier for those in the West to criticize Russia’s hegemony over certain neighboring areas more openly. While this has renewed interest for the EU and the US to engage and support Ukraine, Moldova and the Belarusian opposition, it has also been a lot more active in areas which had a general consensus of being under Russian influence or patronage.

This discussion expands to two separate wings: (1) the dichotomy of good vs evil and democracy vs authoritarianism particularly in mainstream political discourse in the West which is to some extent also linked to (2) the emergence of regional and emerging global powers seeking an alternative to the heavily US-led Western hegemony on world affairs in all its spheres. One alternative is the discussion of a multipolar world, this focuses mostly on economic and trade relations today but could develop into a genuine geopolitical agenda in means of security as well.

Both Russia and Turkey are major regional powers with interests in growing their influence and become grand actors in world politics. Initially easier for Russia given its Soviet heritage coupled with nuclear weapons, larger landmass, access to natural resources, stronger military and the pockets of micro-allies it has created for itself overtime in different parts of the world, Turkey is doing its best to catch up; it only started looking outside its borders in search of expanding its influence quite recently, initially in the 2005s and increasingly since the 2010s.

Our realist world stipulates prioritizing the security and defense of oneself at the behest of another. Given how military endeavors and defense spending have transformed into a taboo topic with regards to its public, the West emphasized Putin’s authoritarian maneuvers, his disregard for human rights, imprisonment of political opponents and to some extent fed the “democratic peace theory”, which stipulates that democracies don’t go to war with each other, justifying Putin’s aggression on Ukraine as an attack on democracy to make it easier for themselves to explain to their public as to why they should increase defense spending and why they must support Ukraine.However, the US and the EU particularly seemingly ignore that many of their allies are not democracies yet tend to be reliable partners. The narrative of “democracy = good” vs “authoritarianism = bad” being fostered recently will cost Western countries greatly going down the line. Countries with authoritarian tendencies whether completely authoritarian or simply fragile democracies, who have traditionally been allies of the West are indeed looking elsewhere to safeguard the power and influence they hold. Countries such as Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Morocco, India, Pakistan, Brazil, Ethiopia and South Africa would fall under this category.

Our political systems which subsequently influenced international relations (and law) are entirely eurocentric. Our understanding of warfare but also peace-building are the products of Western hegemony on the world. The disparity between Western countries and others is exemplified with the time and resources the West has had to learn along the way. When one policy fails, it gets reformed or replaced, hence progress has been the defining force of European and other Western systems. Yet, while these policies would be the “rule of the land” in one place, the West has the tendency to export this hypothetical policy and aggressively strive to impose it elsewhere. Yet once this policy becomes obsolete back home with a new reformed version of said policy being adopted, the rest of the world had only recently become accustomed with the now obsolete policy which was then the norm according to the West. Two examples for this claim would be the unclear (alternatively non-existent) fine-line between “territorial integrity” and “self-determination of peoples”, both tenants of our current world order. This intertwines with our flawed understanding on “sovereignty.” A product of the fallacious Peace of Westphalia which brought about the end to the Thirty years’ war in Europe, it did not halt states intervening in others or undermining another’s so-called “sovereignty”, it simply made it taboo, which has over-time established our current political discourse. One could argue this is why many populist politicians on both extremes of the political spectrum are so popular and why many of these politicians are ostracized from mainstream political establishments. The image of the dishonest politician was born through this understanding.

That being said, Erdogan’s foreign policy is immensely interesting as it compartmentalizes different actors and interests with a peculiar Middle Eastern fashion. Regardless of the policies themselves and if we agree with them or not, his politics is quite realist. Both internally and externally, he was able to use different ideologies and relations to his (and arguably his country’s) advantage using a set of pragmatic and pluralist ideas. As a disclaimer, it should be said that qualifying Erdogan’s policies as realist is a means of using both discourse analysis coupled with the assessment of the initial stages of the ideology or policy at hand and is not an analysis of their successes or failures.

The transition from a grand Empire to a Republic, especially in Turkey (unlike other similar transitions elsewhere) is very important to highlight to understand current Turkish affairs. The idea of the “republic” in Turkey for a very long time was synonymous with its founder, Atatürk. Even those in the opposition in Turkey who criticize Erdogan’s government tend to use Atatürk’s legacy to their advantage, explaining that the current leadership has strayed away from the path which Atatürk had built. Through a Constructivist approach, we can see that while “the father of modern Turkey” enacted numerous reforms and established the current borders of the country, his flaws mixed with his supposed flawless cult of personality still linger today, creating a paradox for a Turkey fighting for a supposed better future (as any other state would/should). First, the drastic breakup between Empire and Republic was forcibly imposed using the top-down approach especially with reforms dealing with culture, tradition and religion all of which together has espoused a transgenerational identity crisis in the country. Whereas countries like Germany drastically and successfully changed national narratives, which in turn redefined German identity, around 5 times in 100 years (it is besides the point if these narratives where “good” or “bad”), the one time Turkey did that was not fully implemented. Turkey, on paper, through its predecessor state, the Ottoman Empire, lost in WWI but reached a relatively beneficial peace treaty through Ataturk’s negotiations in the Treaty of Lausanne. Although a winner, it kept on winning with the mindset of a loser which very much translates to the perception of being Turkish and the role of the Turkish state today. Essentially, although Republican Turkey was for most (if not all) of its history at the right place in the right time, it still held the mindset of the victim. This is especially true as a regional geopolitical actor. Turkey’s Ottoman legacy was brushed under the rug, both the good and the ugly, for a new state to be born. If a state is nothing without its people, then people, in a Foucauldian sense are nothing without their emotions, language(s) and the naturally evolving “genealogy of knowledge.” Early Republican Turks were meant to completely alter their knowledge overnight and it was mostly successful in urban areas through what Foucault calls “biopower” in means of the state (in this case authoritarian under Atatürk) complete presence in all aspects of life (specifically one’s “person” or “body” according to Foucault). This was not as implemented in the remote parts of central and especially Eastern Turkey simply because the now centralized state did not have the means to be fully (and forcefully) present in these areas partly because of weak infrastructure which subsequently meant weaker influence of state institutions.

After Atatürk’s death, the struggle to maintain a new and weak democracy on a territory nestled between two strong actors, NATO in the West and the Soviet Union in the East, in the age of ideologies made way for different regimes having different ideologies susceptible to external influence from both be scrutinized under the watchful eyes of the military, the traditional impartial and “nationalist” actor in Turkey.

Different times necessitated different allegiances. While the Soviets were investing in infrastructure in Turkey, the West feared the adoption of Turkey into the communist sphere and had the country be a battleground for influence. This competition still feeds different narratives in Turkish politics and society and has bred the aggressive and nationalist Turkey we have today under Erdogan. For Turkish society, Erdogan brought back religion into the public sphere, emancipating islamist circles which for much of republican history were marginalized. The nostalgia Erdogan fostered with regards to the Ottoman Empire was a very sensitive ordeal, for any misstep would have cost Turkey greatly. Given the sensitivity of honoring Ottoman history for all the right reasons, for which there are many, Erdogan instead failed with this regard. Thanks to his former foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, who spearheaded Turkey’s neo-Ottomanist foreign policy, this “neo-Ottomanism” failed to remain in the foreign affairs sphere and instead infiltrated mainstream Turkish discourse internally as well (again, it is besides the point if “neo-Ottomanism” in foreign affairs is “good” or “bad”). Whereas, Turkey’s foreign ministry website still boasts Atatürk’s famous slogan “peace at home, peace in the world”, it has contributed the opposite for both with its endeavors to expand its sphere of influence. Diverging its attention from its relations with the EU and the US, especially its disenfranchisement due to its now obvious inability to join the EU, Turkey turned its attention to its immediate neighbors, those of the Middle East, which it it had for a very long time looked down upon as uncivilized (a product of Atatürk’s Eurocentrism and idealization of “western civilization”). As such besides its historic enmity with Greece and subsequent occupation of northern Cyprus, Erdogan expanded his efforts to the east; he adopted a hawkish stance against Israel, espousing pro-palestinian rhetoric which gained him immense popularity there; sided with the opposition in Syria from the early days of the revolution in 2011 which culminated in the Syrian Civil War and then actively participated in arming anti-government often islamist groups while actively hindering any attempts of an independent Rojava and extending his crusade against the Kurds beyond Turkey’s borders; sought to become the patron of the Sunni community in Lebanon after the short vacuum Saudi Arabia left in the country; became more involved in Iraqi Kurdistan by pitting different groups against each other while benefitting from the region’s natural resources; allegedly provided smuggling routes for goods to leave and enter Iran through its territory; antagonized Armenia after it had initially sought to normalize relations and supported (allegedly encouraged) Azerbaijan to wage a war in 2020 against them (allegedly) with Putin’s blessing; sought to strengthen the Turkic cooperation council, angering Russia and China for what they deem to be Turkey meddling in their spheres of influence but also sovereignty; sided with the muslim brotherhood and former President Morsi in Egypt, angering the entirety of the Arab Gulf countries and subsequently Egypt as well except for Qatar, its only partner; meddled in Libya to the dismay of countries like Egypt, Greece and France while claiming sovereignty on Greece’s internationally recognized waters; meddles in Bulgaria under the guise of protecting the rights of the Turkish minority; has been heavily present in countries with large Muslim populations such as Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia, to the dismay of their neighbors; built a military base under the guise of a defense academy in Somalia, continues to leverage refugees in negotiations with the EU and finally refused to side with the West and NATO in their support of Ukraine as it fights against Russian aggression.

If I were to expand on each of these points individually, I would be required to publish a voluminous book of many volumes. This makes analyzing Turkey’s geopolitical role in our current world very interesting but also very difficult particularly when attempting to discuss its relations with another questionable country equally involved in different parts of the world.

Studying grand geopolitical actors like Turkey and Russia from the prism of one region especially in relation to one another would be lacking as these actors are neither allies nor enemies. In a world where politics – understanding politics – has become an obligation for the average human to know and engage with, both political discourse and the fast expansion of information, often ridden with misinformation, purports this average human, who has other responsibilities, likes and interests in life to have politics be simplified. In a sense, all of these factors have culminated in seeing politics through the lens of “black” or “white” which has contributed to discussions and concerns on political polarization. We now have to admit that not only the liberal international order is flawed but also our very understanding of liberal democracy in how it is understood, explained, defined, applied and safeguarded in countries that supposedly had nothing to fear going forward.

When Erdogan is accused of being Putin’s “friend”, it is our attempt as humans to simplify what we do not understand and see things in “black” or “white”. Erdogan is surely not “our friend”, in reference to the West, however it does not make him our enemy’s “friend” in retrospect. This understanding showcases the flawed fine-line between impartial and partial academia. Both are scientifically accurate and informed assessments however the former does not depend or condemn any narrative, whereby the academic dissociates themselves from their assessments and the latter essentially feeds a political agenda. Which again, does not make it “wrong”. If what we choose to say can be received and understood differently then adding the countless publications of two of humanity’s greatest minds, Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu, have explained in the relationship between Politics/Power and Language, makes it even more interesting. It is not only what we say and who we say it to but also how we say it. Then of course, what do we intend to do with this information? What results do we seek? — thereby disturbing our age-old christian understanding of “absolute truth” which often translates to the “ideal” today. And in a world where ideas, actions and events can be explained through different truths (all validly true) it becomes not only a matter of perspective but also intent in means of disseminating knowledge. This is why the dichotomy of “good vs evil” in a binary application on current Western political discourse through the prism of “democracy vs autocracy” is harmful for the future of the international political order but also with regards to national politics in Europe and the rest of the world, in both established democracies and established autocracies on a spectrum that includes all the different “flawed” and hybrid systems that there are. It is indeed exhausting for the most learned individual let alone the average citizen burdened by the responsibility of political participation to understand all of these complexities and nuances.

When we say that “Erdogan is only Erdogan’s friend” we must add to this understanding the way politics and diplomacy works and always has had in the Middle East. Erdogan’s style, although deemed peculiar in a western context, is the norm in the Middle East. Politics from the prism of trade deals, diplomacy, conflict resolution and everything in between is done through interpersonal leader-to-leader dynamics. This would blur the lines between the leader of the state, in the case President Erdogan and the (his) state. We can draw parallels of this throughout Middle Eastern countries where it is the norm and contrast it with certain cases in the Western world where it is the exception and looked down upon. One reason for this is that most Western countries have strong institutions and democratic systems; state and government are not synonymous.

Through this understanding, a look closer at Russian-Turkish relations which often is explained as a “transactional relationship”, we show its successes. Vladimir Putin is an authoritarian leader who has gradually blurred the lines between the Russian state and himself. Numerous are those who attempt to portray his image as a hyper-masculine, toxic, aggressive and charismatic one. Naturally, he would get along with other leaders who also have authoritarian tendencies.

This brings us to our last point: both Erdogan and Putin converge in their desire for a multipolar world. Underneath their discourse showcasing their desire to expand their economic, financial and trade relations through policies to be implemented outside the hegemony of the United States, further explained under their guise of “sovereignty” is actually their desire to rule their country and expand their influence without checks and balances. Although often used in a derogatory way, the United States and increasingly the European Union and other Western democracies tend to act as the “world’s police.” Naturally, the worst thing an authoritarian leader could hear is that they cannot just do as they please. It frustrates them. This point is linked to the very first point made in which many of the West’s allies (great allies) are authoritarian countries and the dichotomy of “democracy=good” and “autocracy=bad” gives them the impression that they are not indispensable and that this allyship is only coincidental and momentary. It frightens them and jeopardizes their (often absolute) grip on politics in their respective countries. The leaders of countries such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan and others must actually be natural allies of other authoritarians such as Putin or Xi Jinping. Once the leaders of these countries find alternatives in means of defense and security (a state’s main concern according to realism is survival), they would seek to create a multipolar world with a major focus on economic and financial policies. This point is in reference to, among others, the BRICS showing interest to engage in de-dollarization which excited Turkey’s Erdogan. This is very unlikely for the near future however in a world mired with exceptions, risks and “miracles”, history teaches us that nothing is impossible.